ALICE Z. XU

The Political origins of the “Tragedy of the commons:” Deforestation in the Brazilian amazon, 2000-2012

Despite national policies that limit deforestation, some local jurisdictions in Brazil still experience much higher rates of deforestation than others. Using detailed satellite imagery data, I explore the ways in which local political competition explains this variation. I use the competitiveness of elections at higher levels of government to construct a shift-share instrument for causally estimating municipal political competition. The results show that although the median voter has a strong preference for conservation, local political competition causally increases deforestation, especially in municipalities with private commercial interests that deforestation. I argue that in shortening time horizons, political competition encourages Brazilian mayor to engage in the strategic non-enforcement of environmental standards to cater to such vested interests. Drawing on qualitative interviews and administrative data on the timing of bureaucratic appointments, I show that to achieve this end, mayors use a strategy I term “bureaucratic packing,” a surge in appointments of new personnel, to bypass existing personnel who may not aid the mayor's agenda. In contrast to existing theories on the benefits of new appointments for rewarding patrons, the analysis spotlights ``bureaucratic packing'' as an understudied strategy used to weaken regulatory capacity. Political competition generates incentives for undermining bureaucratic capacity as a means to allow deforestation.